2. Summarize Unger’s argument for skepticism about the external world. What assumptions about our knowledge does Unger need to make for his argument to go through? (You won’t be able to explain all the assumptions, but explain something that wouldn’t be captured in a three-sentence summary of the argument. One option is to explain the Assumption of Reasoning.) Are these assumptions correct, or is there a way to escape Unger’s argument?

3. Moore says that he is more certain that he knows that this is a pencil than he would be of the premises of any argument to the contrary. What does he mean by this? How is this meant to refute skepticism? Is Moore’s position reasonable?

4. In chapter 3 of the Signficance of Philosophical Scepticism, Stroud distinguishes “internal” and “external” perspectives on knowledge. What is the difference? How do they relate to skepticism? How does he think they help explain what Moore may be up to?

5. In chapter 3, of the Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Stroud acknowledges that sometimes we may point to specific things we know in order to refute a claim that we don’t know anything in that area. Why doesn’t he think that Moore can refute the claim that we don’t know anything about the external world by pointing to his knowledge that he has hands?

6. What does Chisholm mean by particularism and methodism? How can particularism help us fight Cartesian skepticism? Is it a good way of fighting Cartesian skepticism?

7. Sosa argues that, though in a way the justification of his theory of knowledge is circular, that this circularity is acceptable. What kind of circularity does he see in his theory? Why does he think it is acceptable? Is he right? (For the last question, you might want to consider Stroud’s arguments.)

8. Dretske says that, when we make a knowledge claim, that claim always takes place against a background of relevant contrasts. What does he mean by that? How does that explain the violation of deductive closure? How does it help address skepticism?

9. Stine argues against the idea that “all knowledge claims require evidence” (p. 152), and says that there are some circumstances in which we can know things without evidence. Cohen criticizes this view, at least as it pertains to moderate skeptical hypotheses; he thinks that when we know a moderate skeptical hypothesis to be false, it is because we have evidence against it. Explain the difference between these views. Which seems superior?

10. What does Cohen mean by a relevant alternative? (Keep in mind that he defines them slightly differently than Stine does.) He defines internal and an external criteria of relevance (see pp. 102-103); why are they both necessary? How does he think relevance is context-sensitive? How does this help him deal with skepticism?

11. Explain Cohen’s distinction between “moderate” and “radical” skeptical hypotheses. Why does he think they need to be treated differently? How does he think we can maintain knowledge in the face of radical skeptical hypotheses? Is his treatment of radical hypotheses adequate?

12. What does Vogel mean by semi-skepticism? How do the Car Theft cases create the threat of semi-skepticism? What role does the Closure Principle play here?

13. Vogel argues that, if neighborhood reliabilism were true, we could gain knowledge through bootstrapping. What does he mean by bootstrapping? How is reliabilism supposed to be possible if we are reliabilists? Why is this a bad thing?

14. In “Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge,” Cohen argues that if we have basic knowledge we can attain some other forms of knowledge too easily. Explain what he means by basic knowledge, what he means by easy knowledge, and how basic knowledge would lead to easy knowledge. Why is easy knowledge bad? How does Cohen try to avoid the problem of easy knowledge?

You may wish to explore an argument as it threads through many papers, with objections and responses, or to focus on one or two papers and explore their main topics in depth. The following topics are just suggestions of some of the things that might work (and some of them are very specific). If you want to write on a topic that isn’t listed below, feel free. If you’d like to discuss a topic, either to make sure it’s OK or to bounce your ideas off me, my office hours are before class in 70 S. Williams St., or you can e-mail me at mcweiner@uvm.edu.

1. Consider Moore’s anti-skeptical argument, and evaluate it from the perspectives of one or more of the other philosophers we have read. (Stroud, Unger, and Chisholm are all worth considering; if a philosopher doesn’t address Moore explicitly, you can say what you think they would say in response to Moore’s argument.) Does Moore provide an argument against skepticism or a way to avoid the question? Does his attempt to take on skepticism succeed?

2. Explain the principle of known deductive closure. How does it play a role in skeptical arguments? How can it play a role in antiskeptical arguments like Moore’s? Are there any reasons to doubt that deductive closure holds? Is it possible (as in Stine’s and Cohen’s relevant alternative theories) to uphold deductive closure while continuing to respect skeptical and antiskeptical intuitions?

3. Explain Chisholm’s distinction between particularism and methodism and consider how it affects one (or maybe more) of the skeptical debates that we’ve been discussing. For instance, can a particularist uphold the Moorean response to Unger’s skeptical argument? Or, can a particularist address the kind of circularity objection that Stroud makes to Sosa and to the classical epistemological project in general? Does particularism provide an answer to skepticism or does it miss the point? Does it answer the sort of semi-skepticism that Vogel discusses? (If you write on this topic you will almost certainly not want to answer all these questions.)

4. Sosa argues that, though reliabilism is circular, any theory of knowledge must be circular in that way, and this circularity isn’t a problem. Stroud (in his reply to Sosa) agrees that this circularity is inescapable for any theory of knowledge, but thinks it is a problem for the general epistemic enterprise. Who is right, or are both wrong? You should explain exactly how Sosa thinks the circularity comes about and why he doesn’t think it’s a problem.

5. Discuss the relevant alternatives view as explained by (at least one of) Dretske, Stine, and Cohen. How is this view supposed to handle skeptical scenarios like the brain in a vat and the cunningly disguised mule? Is this a good account of knowledge? You may wish to consider the objections raised by Vogel.

6. Discuss Cohen’s method in “How To Be a Fallibilist” and whether it helps his argument. Rather than attempting to start with a conception of what it is to be a relevant alternative and seeing what impact that has on various conceptions of knowledge, Cohen defines relevance in terms of its impact on knowledge, and then he uses specific examples of what we know and don’t know to determine what the criteria for relevance might be. This is a particularist approach as defined by Chisholm. Does this approach help him deal with objections to a general theory of knowledge as raised by Stroud? Does he have to deal with these objections? How does he use this approach to try to block the objection that his criteria of knowledge aren’t precise enough? What about the objection that he is begging the question against the skeptic? (If you write on this topic you might not want to answer all the questions I’ve raised here.)

7. Both Cohen and Vogel discuss a difference between two kinds of skeptical hypotheses. Cohen contrasts “radical” and “moderate” skeptical hypotheses, and Vogel contrasts the “semiskepticism” that arises from his car theft cases with full-blown skepticism. Explain these distinctions, and whether the arguments made by each philosopher apply to the other philosophers’ distinction. In particular, does Cohen’s approach to moderate skeptical hypotheses provide a way of dealing with Vogel’s semiskepticism?

8. What is the bootstrapping problem? Why is it supposed to be a problem? Why does Cohen think that it is not simply a problem for reliabilists, and that Vogel’s proposed solution does not necessarily solve it? How does Cohen attempt to solve it? Does his attempt succeed?

2. Sosa argues that “foundationalism of the given” can’t work unless you turn it into reliabilism. Explain his argument for this. (Obviously, to do this, you will have to explain what foundationalism of the given and reliabilism are.)

3. Why does Sosa think that we can obtain a satisfactory understanding of our knowledge through a theory of knowledge that is self-supporting? Why does he think that this is the best that we can hope for?

4. Stroud argues that the general epistemological project will always leave us dissatisfied. What does he mean by this? Why does he think this?

5. At the end of “Epistemic Operators,” Dretske presents a theory on which knowledge is always ascribed against a background of relevant alternatives. Explain how he uses this theory to argue against deductive closure (in his terms, that knowledge is semipenetrating).

6. Stine claims that there are some things that we can know without having any evidence for them. Under what circumstances does she think this happens?

You may need to log on using your NetID to access the JSTOR database. You can log on by going here, clicking on EZProxy, and entering your ID and password. Then, with luck, this link should work.

If you cannot follow the above link even after logging on through EZProxy, try going through the UVM library page for the Journal of Philosophy; go here and follow links to the Dec. 24, 1970 issue of the journal (vol. 67, no. 24). Click on the 1970-1979 link, then the vol. 67, no. 24 link, then on the link for “Epistemic Operators.” (I’ve checked these links from off-campus, but let me know if you have trouble with them.)