Review Questions for Final Exam
Review questions for the final exam are below. You will be asked eight of these questions and asked to answer five of them in essays of about four substantive paragraphs.
1. Why does Stroud (in Chapter 1 of the Significance of Philosophical Scepticism) say that we cannot devise or apply a test to tell whether we are dreaming? Must we be able to know we are not dreaming in order to have knowledge about the world?
2. Summarize Unger’s argument for skepticism about the external world. What assumptions about our knowledge does Unger need to make for his argument to go through? (You won’t be able to explain all the assumptions, but explain something that wouldn’t be captured in a three-sentence summary of the argument. One option is to explain the Assumption of Reasoning.) Are these assumptions correct, or is there a way to escape Unger’s argument?
3. Moore says that he is more certain that he knows that this is a pencil than he would be of the premises of any argument to the contrary. What does he mean by this? How is this meant to refute skepticism? Is Moore’s position reasonable?
4. In chapter 3 of the Signficance of Philosophical Scepticism, Stroud distinguishes “internal” and “external” perspectives on knowledge. What is the difference? How do they relate to skepticism? How does he think they help explain what Moore may be up to?
5. In chapter 3, of the Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Stroud acknowledges that sometimes we may point to specific things we know in order to refute a claim that we don’t know anything in that area. Why doesn’t he think that Moore can refute the claim that we don’t know anything about the external world by pointing to his knowledge that he has hands?
6. What does Chisholm mean by particularism and methodism? How can particularism help us fight Cartesian skepticism? Is it a good way of fighting Cartesian skepticism?
7. Sosa argues that, though in a way the justification of his theory of knowledge is circular, that this circularity is acceptable. What kind of circularity does he see in his theory? Why does he think it is acceptable? Is he right? (For the last question, you might want to consider Stroud’s arguments.)
8. Dretske says that, when we make a knowledge claim, that claim always takes place against a background of relevant contrasts. What does he mean by that? How does that explain the violation of deductive closure? How does it help address skepticism?
9. Stine argues against the idea that “all knowledge claims require evidence” (p. 152), and says that there are some circumstances in which we can know things without evidence. Cohen criticizes this view, at least as it pertains to moderate skeptical hypotheses; he thinks that when we know a moderate skeptical hypothesis to be false, it is because we have evidence against it. Explain the difference between these views. Which seems superior?
10. What does Cohen mean by a relevant alternative? (Keep in mind that he defines them slightly differently than Stine does.) He defines internal and an external criteria of relevance (see pp. 102-103); why are they both necessary? How does he think relevance is context-sensitive? How does this help him deal with skepticism?
11. Explain Cohen’s distinction between “moderate” and “radical” skeptical hypotheses. Why does he think they need to be treated differently? How does he think we can maintain knowledge in the face of radical skeptical hypotheses? Is his treatment of radical hypotheses adequate?
12. What does Vogel mean by semi-skepticism? How do the Car Theft cases create the threat of semi-skepticism? What role does the Closure Principle play here?
13. Vogel argues that, if neighborhood reliabilism were true, we could gain knowledge through bootstrapping. What does he mean by bootstrapping? How is reliabilism supposed to be possible if we are reliabilists? Why is this a bad thing?
14. In “Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge,” Cohen argues that if we have basic knowledge we can attain some other forms of knowledge too easily. Explain what he means by basic knowledge, what he means by easy knowledge, and how basic knowledge would lead to easy knowledge. Why is easy knowledge bad? How does Cohen try to avoid the problem of easy knowledge?
